Türkçe
  • Iraq
  • Iran
  • Palestine-Israel
  • Syria
  • Lebanon
  • Egypt
  • Yemen
  • Turkmens
  • Gulf of Basra
  • Gulf of Aden
  • Terror-Middle East
  • Turkey-Middle East
  • Central Asia-Middle East
  • Caucasus-Middle East
  • Think Tanks
  • Conferences - Symposiums
  • Geopolitics Meetings
  • Roundtable Discussions
  • Turkmen Intellectuals Meetings
  • The Kirkuk representative of the Sadr Group Al-Sakri underlined that they want Kirkuk remained as attached to Bagdad. Al-Sakri said "Kirkuk is as important as our religion."
    The Iraqi Amir of Yazidis’ Anwar Muawiya İsmail explained that especially since 2003, there has been a great pressure on Yazidis, most of whom live in Mosul.
    ISCI Kirkuk Representative Necad Huseyin Hasan expressed that their own wish was to see Turkey more powerful in the region.
    Selahaddin Provincial Council's General Secretary Niyazi Mimaroglu, stated that they owe their success to serving to all the public by not discriminating.
    The Governor of Salahaddin province Abdülcabbar El-Kerim said “This province always welcomes the Turkish investors.”
    Ali Hasim Muhtaroğlu told that the political successes of the Turkmen in the Salahaddin Province increased enormously in the recent years.
    Usame Dede said that the Turkmen living in Diyala recently started to have more self-confidence and to be more active in the local politics.
    Basil El Gureyri, the vice president of the Center for Iraq Strategic Studies shared his assessments on the Iraq Elections
    Azad Chalak, executive editor of Rozname, which is close to Goran, attributed Goran’s failure to underutilizing nationalist rhetoric.
    The chairman of the executive board of the Turkish-Kurdish Friendship Association, based in Arbil, Shivan Taveng claimed that if Turkey wants regional power, its best leverage is the Kurds.
    Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd Al-Mahdi answered ORSAM's questions on Iraq’s main problems, domestic politics and election issues.
    Alon Ben-Meir, Professor of International Relations, has answered ORSAM's questions regarding recent Middle East politics and Turkey's role.
    In the interview with Aude Sgnoles, the municipal governance in Gaza and the causes of Hamas' success were discussed.
    Meeting with the Iraqi Turkish Teachers
    On the meeting, there was an exchange of ideas on the troubles in the education system.
    Iraqi Bektashis in ORSAM
    The current position of Bektashi community, their problems and the possible solutions were handled.
    Decision of Cooperation Between Baghdad University and ORSAM
    Delegations exchanged views about academic cooperation and joint activities.
    American House of Delegates Members and Senators at ORSAM
    The American Delegation from Virginia and Maryland received a briefing on Turkey-US relations.
    ORSAM-IAMES Meeting
    The sides decided upon having joint studies on the Middle East and Turkey-Vietnam relations.
    The Final Communiqué of the Turkey-Iraq Relations Symposium Has Been Declared:
    "Let's rewrite the history of the Middle East together"
    The First Turkey-Yemen Forum was Held
    The Forum in Istanbul was organized by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ORSAM and İTO.
    The Full Text of Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government's President Massoud Barzani's Speech at ORSAM on 4 June 2010
    ORSAM Hosted UN Iraq Special Representative Ad Melkert
    Melkert said that Turkey is a constructive model for Iraq.
    AZAD CHALAK: “AS GORAN WE MUST END OUR CONTROVERSY WITH KDP-PUK”

    Azad Chalak, executive editor of Rozname, which broadcasts in Sulaymaniyah and is known for its relationship with Goran, evaluated Goran’s performance in the last elections. While Chalak attributed Goran’s failure to underutilizing nationalist rhetoric, he emphasized that the Kurdish parties’ number of votes hadn’t changed, but only the number of their MPs. Chalak said, “As Goran, we have to adopt a discourse based on Kurds’ interests, not a policy of opposition to the KDP-PUK alliance.”
     
    How do you evaluate the effects of Iraqi parliamentary elections in the Kurdish region?
     
    The results weren’t a surprise for Iraq in general. But we were expecting Maliki to come in first, and he fell behind by a single point. The real surprise was Goran. We were expecting Goran to win more seats, especially in Kirkuk. We shouldn’t forget election frauds’ effect on the results. When we look at the results from the point of view of Kurdish regional politics, we can say that previously the Kurds had 58 out of 275 seats in the Iraqi Parliament. And we won 58 of the 325 seats at stake in this election. So there is a proportional reduction in representation. The Kurds faced important losses because of the election system. Election strategy gave Sunnis very good results, and this powerfully affected the situation in Mosul and Kirkuk. Iraqiyya’s nationalist rhetoric in Baghdad will have negative effects on Kurds. This is important because we are neighbors with the Sunni Arabs who support Iraqiyya in the disputed regions. 
     
    Well then, what kind of outcomes will these elections lead to in the Kurds’ regional politics?    
    When we look at the number of votes, we see that the KDP won fewer votes than the combined votes of Goran and the PUK. Goran and the PUK had important difficulties comprehending the election system. The KDP focused on a few candidates, and used the right election strategy. The results are a strategic success in the elections for the KDP. If the PUK had used a good election strategy, it could have won 2-3 more seats. By the way, an agreement was signed among the 5 Kurdish parties that won seats in the Iraqi Parliament, to form a coalition. According to this agreement, the KDP will be the coalition leader, but it won’t make decisions on its own. If the KDP takes action on its own, the other parties will abandon them. So the likelihood of the alliance’s collapse is low. 
     
    Goran had good results in the regional assembly and regional presidential elections, but failed to achieve a similar success in Iraq’s parliamentary elections. What do you attribute this to?
     
    The biggest failure of Goran was its failure to use adequately nationalist rhetoric. The PUK and KDP used more nationalist rhetoric. I think that is why they were more successful. This is valid, especially for Kurds who live in Kirkuk and disputed regions, because the problems there evolve and develop in the context of nationalism. Kurdish voters there vote with more nationalist preoccupations because they don’t feel safe. Similarly, Iraqiyya voters and Turkmens also voted for nationalist rhetoric.  Goran’s perspective on Kirkuk differs from that of the other parties. Although we don’t have a major difference in perspective from other parties, we support more peaceful ways to resolve the problem. Of course, the constitution’s provision 140 has to be implemented, but we have a different perspective on how it should be implemented. The issue has to be solved through ongoing dialog over an extended period of time. It shouldn’t be implemented by force. There is also no other solution for us. However, the other parties made use of nationalist slogans and it worked out. We think that there should be transparency and that everything should be discussed. Our vision is to provide a peaceful life for Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. Another factor in Goran’s election failure is the lack of major big financial support. The KDP and the PUK campaigns had bigger opportunities in this area. 
     
    How will the election results affect Kirkuk in the future?
     
    It is certain that there was much fraud in Kirkuk’s predominantly Arab Hawija district. Besides, when you count the votes Kurdish parties won in Kirkuk, you still see the Kurds in first place. The Kurds will focus on the next provincial assembly elections from now on. If Kurds run in this election on one list, they will be more successful than they are now. 
     
    What would you like to say about Goran’s future?
     
    First, Goran should criticize its recent past. It must carefully analyze its first successful election and see what was successful in the last election. It has to determine the next election’s policies on this basis. In fact, we can say that a process of self criticism has begun. For example, we’ve published studies about our mistakes. We have to adopt rhetoric that is based on the interests of the Kurdish people, not a policy of opposition to the KDP-PUK alliance. We have to criticize the system. Of course, we have to continue our discourses about freedom, democracy, human rights and transparency, but we shouldn’t be all about opposition. We have to continue our role of watching over the government. 
     
    Goran will be in Baghdad from now on. What will the movement’s approach there be like?
     
    Goran’s approach will depend on the other parties’ attitudes. If they insist on their opinions, then we won’t insist on staying in the Kurdish coalition. They have to listen to our ideas. So we can call this conditional support. 
     
    How do you evaluate the relations between Turkey and the Regional Kurdish Authority?
     
    Relations are more relaxed now. We must have peaceful relations with both Turkey and other nations, especially with our neighbors since the condition of these relations directly affects the condition of the Kurdistan Regional Authority. 
     
    Is there a relationship between Turkey and Goran? If there is, how do you evaluate the quality of the relationship?
     
    Unfortunately, there is not. We hope that soon we may have good relations with Turkey. 
     
    Thanks for sparing us your time.
     
    *This interview was conducted by ORSAM Middle East specialist, Oytun Orhan, and ORSAM’s chief editor, Ogün Duru, in Sulaymaniyah on May 14, 2010. We thank Shalaw Fatah for his successful translation.
     
     June 28 2010  
         
    03 September 2010 (ENG / TR)
    02 September 2010 (ENG / TR)
    01 September 2010 (ENG / TR)

    ORSAM Report No: 18

    FROM NEIGHBORHOOD TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCE:
    TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
    (Tr-Русский)

    ORSAM Report No:17

    EVALUATION OF 7 MARCH 2010 IRAQ PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS AND THE NEW POLITICAL EQUATION
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Rapor No: 16

    SULTANATE OF OMAN :
    A COUNTRY ON THE ARAB PENINSULA CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITIONALISM AND MODERNITY
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No: 15

    OBSERVATION REPORT OF ORSAM DELEGATION ON 
    7 MARCH 2010 IRAQI ELECTIONS 
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No. 14
    POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ DURING THE PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION

    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No. 13
    AN ANALYSIS ON THE POLITICAL STANCE OF THE SHIITE PARTIES AND THE VOTERS, BEFORE THE MARCH 7 ELECTION IN IRAQ
    (In Turkish)

    Report No. 12
    THE INFLUENCE OF THE FACTOR OF IRAQ ON TURKEY’S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES (1990-2008)
    (In Turkish and Russian)

    ORSAM Report No. 11

    THE FORGOTTEN TURKS: TURKMENS OF LEBANON

    ORSAM Report No. 10

    CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN: THE POWER STRUGGLE, REGIONAL INFLUENCES AND RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

    ORSAM Report No. 9

    THE YEMEN ISSUE:
    A STEP TOWARD REGIONAL WAR?

    ORSAM Report No. 8

    ABKHAZIA FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE BLACK SEA 

    ORSAM Report No. 7

    THE FORGOTTEN TURKMEN LAND: DIYALA

    ORSAM Report No. 6

    THE TUZHURMATU TURKMENS: A SUCCESS STORY

    ORSAM Report No. 5
    TURKEY - LEBANON RELATIONS: PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY AMONG THE RELIGIOUS AND SECTARIAN FACTIONS IN LEBANON
     

    ORSAM Report No. 4

    2009 LEBANON ELECTIONS: WINNERS, LOSERS AND TURKEY
    (In Turkish)

    Home Page    |    Subscribe    |    Contact    |    Press    |    Site Map    |    Links    |    Rss