Azad Chalak, executive editor of Rozname, which broadcasts in Sulaymaniyah and is known for its relationship with Goran, evaluated Goran’s performance in the last elections. While Chalak attributed Goran’s failure to underutilizing nationalist rhetoric, he emphasized that the Kurdish parties’ number of votes hadn’t changed, but only the number of their MPs. Chalak said, “As Goran, we have to adopt a discourse based on Kurds’ interests, not a policy of opposition to the KDP-PUK alliance.”
How do you evaluate the effects of Iraqi parliamentary elections in the Kurdish region?
The results weren’t a surprise for Iraq in general. But we were expecting Maliki to come in first, and he fell behind by a single point. The real surprise was Goran. We were expecting Goran to win more seats, especially in Kirkuk. We shouldn’t forget election frauds’ effect on the results. When we look at the results from the point of view of Kurdish regional politics, we can say that previously the Kurds had 58 out of 275 seats in the Iraqi Parliament. And we won 58 of the 325 seats at stake in this election. So there is a proportional reduction in representation. The Kurds faced important losses because of the election system. Election strategy gave Sunnis very good results, and this powerfully affected the situation in Mosul and Kirkuk. Iraqiyya’s nationalist rhetoric in Baghdad will have negative effects on Kurds. This is important because we are neighbors with the Sunni Arabs who support Iraqiyya in the disputed regions.
Well then, what kind of outcomes will these elections lead to in the Kurds’ regional politics?
When we look at the number of votes, we see that the KDP won fewer votes than the combined votes of Goran and the PUK. Goran and the PUK had important difficulties comprehending the election system. The KDP focused on a few candidates, and used the right election strategy. The results are a strategic success in the elections for the KDP. If the PUK had used a good election strategy, it could have won 2-3 more seats. By the way, an agreement was signed among the 5 Kurdish parties that won seats in the Iraqi Parliament, to form a coalition. According to this agreement, the KDP will be the coalition leader, but it won’t make decisions on its own. If the KDP takes action on its own, the other parties will abandon them. So the likelihood of the alliance’s collapse is low.
Goran had good results in the regional assembly and regional presidential elections, but failed to achieve a similar success in Iraq’s parliamentary elections. What do you attribute this to?
The biggest failure of Goran was its failure to use adequately nationalist rhetoric. The PUK and KDP used more nationalist rhetoric. I think that is why they were more successful. This is valid, especially for Kurds who live in Kirkuk and disputed regions, because the problems there evolve and develop in the context of nationalism. Kurdish voters there vote with more nationalist preoccupations because they don’t feel safe. Similarly, Iraqiyya voters and Turkmens also voted for nationalist rhetoric. Goran’s perspective on Kirkuk differs from that of the other parties. Although we don’t have a major difference in perspective from other parties, we support more peaceful ways to resolve the problem. Of course, the constitution’s provision 140 has to be implemented, but we have a different perspective on how it should be implemented. The issue has to be solved through ongoing dialog over an extended period of time. It shouldn’t be implemented by force. There is also no other solution for us. However, the other parties made use of nationalist slogans and it worked out. We think that there should be transparency and that everything should be discussed. Our vision is to provide a peaceful life for Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens. Another factor in Goran’s election failure is the lack of major big financial support. The KDP and the PUK campaigns had bigger opportunities in this area.
How will the election results affect Kirkuk in the future?
It is certain that there was much fraud in Kirkuk’s predominantly Arab Hawija district. Besides, when you count the votes Kurdish parties won in Kirkuk, you still see the Kurds in first place. The Kurds will focus on the next provincial assembly elections from now on. If Kurds run in this election on one list, they will be more successful than they are now.
What would you like to say about Goran’s future?
First, Goran should criticize its recent past. It must carefully analyze its first successful election and see what was successful in the last election. It has to determine the next election’s policies on this basis. In fact, we can say that a process of self criticism has begun. For example, we’ve published studies about our mistakes. We have to adopt rhetoric that is based on the interests of the Kurdish people, not a policy of opposition to the KDP-PUK alliance. We have to criticize the system. Of course, we have to continue our discourses about freedom, democracy, human rights and transparency, but we shouldn’t be all about opposition. We have to continue our role of watching over the government.
Goran will be in Baghdad from now on. What will the movement’s approach there be like?
Goran’s approach will depend on the other parties’ attitudes. If they insist on their opinions, then we won’t insist on staying in the Kurdish coalition. They have to listen to our ideas. So we can call this conditional support.
How do you evaluate the relations between Turkey and the Regional Kurdish Authority?
Relations are more relaxed now. We must have peaceful relations with both Turkey and other nations, especially with our neighbors since the condition of these relations directly affects the condition of the Kurdistan Regional Authority.
Is there a relationship between Turkey and Goran? If there is, how do you evaluate the quality of the relationship?
Unfortunately, there is not. We hope that soon we may have good relations with Turkey.
Thanks for sparing us your time.
*This interview was conducted by ORSAM Middle East specialist, Oytun Orhan, and ORSAM’s chief editor, Ogün Duru, in Sulaymaniyah on May 14, 2010. We thank Shalaw Fatah for his successful translation.