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  • The Kirkuk representative of the Sadr Group Al-Sakri underlined that they want Kirkuk remained as attached to Bagdad. Al-Sakri said "Kirkuk is as important as our religion."
    The Iraqi Amir of Yazidis’ Anwar Muawiya İsmail explained that especially since 2003, there has been a great pressure on Yazidis, most of whom live in Mosul.
    ISCI Kirkuk Representative Necad Huseyin Hasan expressed that their own wish was to see Turkey more powerful in the region.
    Selahaddin Provincial Council's General Secretary Niyazi Mimaroglu, stated that they owe their success to serving to all the public by not discriminating.
    The Governor of Salahaddin province Abdülcabbar El-Kerim said “This province always welcomes the Turkish investors.”
    Ali Hasim Muhtaroğlu told that the political successes of the Turkmen in the Salahaddin Province increased enormously in the recent years.
    Usame Dede said that the Turkmen living in Diyala recently started to have more self-confidence and to be more active in the local politics.
    Basil El Gureyri, the vice president of the Center for Iraq Strategic Studies shared his assessments on the Iraq Elections
    Azad Chalak, executive editor of Rozname, which is close to Goran, attributed Goran’s failure to underutilizing nationalist rhetoric.
    The chairman of the executive board of the Turkish-Kurdish Friendship Association, based in Arbil, Shivan Taveng claimed that if Turkey wants regional power, its best leverage is the Kurds.
    Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd Al-Mahdi answered ORSAM's questions on Iraq’s main problems, domestic politics and election issues.
    Alon Ben-Meir, Professor of International Relations, has answered ORSAM's questions regarding recent Middle East politics and Turkey's role.
    In the interview with Aude Sgnoles, the municipal governance in Gaza and the causes of Hamas' success were discussed.
    Meeting with the Iraqi Turkish Teachers
    On the meeting, there was an exchange of ideas on the troubles in the education system.
    Iraqi Bektashis in ORSAM
    The current position of Bektashi community, their problems and the possible solutions were handled.
    Decision of Cooperation Between Baghdad University and ORSAM
    Delegations exchanged views about academic cooperation and joint activities.
    American House of Delegates Members and Senators at ORSAM
    The American Delegation from Virginia and Maryland received a briefing on Turkey-US relations.
    ORSAM-IAMES Meeting
    The sides decided upon having joint studies on the Middle East and Turkey-Vietnam relations.
    The Final Communiqué of the Turkey-Iraq Relations Symposium Has Been Declared:
    "Let's rewrite the history of the Middle East together"
    The First Turkey-Yemen Forum was Held
    The Forum in Istanbul was organized by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ORSAM and İTO.
    The Full Text of Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government's President Massoud Barzani's Speech at ORSAM on 4 June 2010
    ORSAM Hosted UN Iraq Special Representative Ad Melkert
    Melkert said that Turkey is a constructive model for Iraq.
    REBWAR KERIM: “THE KURDS THINK THAT TURKEY HAS TO BE CONVINCED TO PROTECT KURDISH RIGHTS IN IRAQ”

    Rebwar Kerim, executive editor of The Hewler Post in Erbil, said that he thought that Turkey had to be convinced to protect the Iraqi Kurds’ rights in Iraq. Kerim said that he believed that Turkey had been convinced and that Kurds were hopeful about recent political change. Kerim said that especially Nechirvan Barzani wanted to establish close ties with Turkey, and that, on the other hand, Iran is in an intense competition with Turkey in the region. 

    How do you evaluate Iraq’s general elections? What are the points that should be underlined? 

    In reality, these elections didn’t belong to Iraq, but to Iraq’s neighbors. Every country in the region has its own agenda. There is Iran on one side, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the US on the other. In the end, Iran won. Iran won’t let Sunnis pass. If Arab nationalism persists, the Shiites will do that; or, if something else happens, the Shiites will do that. Iraq was the castle of the Arab world, but Iran has broken it. Iraq will be a Shiite state from now on. On the other hand, the Kurds are resolved not to be united with Sunnis. They won’t forget what they suffered at the hands of the Sunni Arabs. 

    How much did the election results live up to the Kurds’ expectations?

    The Kurds expected more in Kirkuk. The competition among the Kurds themselves prevented them from winning more seats. If we look at the results in Mosul, it is a positive result for the Kurds to have won 1/3 of the votes here. 

    How will the election results affect Kurdish regional politics?

    Although it seems that the KDP has a vast majority, this shouldn’t be exaggerated. It is sure that the KDP’s political significance will rise. But the KDP doesn’t want to lose its secular rival, the PUK, because KDP’s real fear is the Islamists. If there is to be opposition against the KDP, it prefers secular parties as rivals. In this sense, Goran’s opposition is a preferable to KDP. Another point is that each party has prolonged its dominance in the regions where it’s powerful. There is no change in this. Politics has yet to be normalized in Iraqi Kurdistan, and independent politics is still not possible. While the KDP prevented others from doing politics in Bahdinan, the PUK and Goran raised similar obstacles in Soran. This control, established with guns in the past, is now established politically. For the first time, it has become very clear who is powerful in which region. 

    But the KDP won support in the Soran region. It won about 100,000 votes…

    It has already had this support. This is an inheritance from the KDP ancestors in Soran. There is a crowd, who sees itself as rooted in the KDP. But the KDP didn’t win the support of young people in the Soran region. 

    Do you agree with comments about the KDP’s superiority in the region? 

    I don’t agree with them. The KDP needs the PUK’s support to attain the presidency of regional authority, because the most powerful authority over the region is the regional administration. I don’t believe that the election results will destroy the alliance between the two parties. In fact, the KDP is waiting for Jalal Talabani’s death. The PUK’s survival depends on Talabani’s presence. Talabani’s charisma is a very important factor for the party. Besides, the KDP’s role as spokesman for the Kurdish movement will increase, but there is an increasing resistance against the KDP’s dominance among Kurds. 

    What do you think is the value of Goran for Kurdish politics?

    Goran’s emergence was a reaction. Now it is a movement. It will lose power, if it becomes a party. It found favor because it was new, but I don’t think it will last. I think that, as a movement, it is excessively leader oriented. The future of the movement after Nechirvan Mustafa is not clear. Goran is also accepted by the KDP. The KDP prefers Goran over its Islamist rivals. There were times and places of Islamist power in the past. They almost made their states and laws dominant. 

    How do you see the PUK’s future?

    The PUK is going through a difficult period after Talabani. There may be unity in the party for a while, but there are various groups in the party that may split with the party in time. The party congress will be held in October this year. We will see the signs of the post-Talabani period at this congress. Three movements have always maintained a presence in the PUK.  The PUK’s strategic agreement caused major criticisms and splits in the party in recent years. 

    In your opinion, are things working out well in Baghdad for Kurds?

    In my judgment, the president of Iraq will be whoever Iran wants. Iran wants a Kurd in that position to signal that Iraq is no longer an Arab country. A Sunni president would be very dangerous to Tehran. Support for the Sunni Arabs also creates anxiety for Kurds. This support also leads the Kurds to feel rejected. Kurds think that if you dispense with us, we will go back home and take care of ourselves. In reality, Iraq is going to break apart. Massoud Barzani’s loud call for bringing Joe Biden’s project that divide Iraq into three states can be explained by this.  Barzani was reacting to strong support for Sunnis and the desire to weaken the Kurds. In my opinion, Turkey also perceives that Iraq will no longer remain as a unitary structure. Their  invitation to Massoud Barzani indicated this.

    Why are relations improving relatively between the Regional Government and Turkey?

    The better the the Kurds understand Turkey, the better relations they have with Turkey. They recognize the differences between government, media and security organizations. Kurds think that Turkey should be persuaded to protect Kurdish rights. And now many, many Kurds believe that Turkey has been persuaded. A very important change occurred with the Justice and Development Party in power. Someone who never would even has been spoken to in the past is being invited to Turkey as the president of Regional Government now. Kurds wants their relations with Turkey to be improved. Nechirvan Barzani, in particular, wants to establish close bonds with Turkey. On the other hand, Berham Saleh is quite open to Iran. His rise tp the Prime Ministers office was made possible by Iran’s efforts. Moreover, when he became the Prime Minister, his first official trip abroad was to Iran. 

    In your opinion, what is now the greatest threat to the Kurds’ gains?

    Kurds are terrified of the central government’s growing strength. The entry of Iraqi troops into Hanekin was a very important sign. The only power that can claim jurisdiction claim over Kurdistan now is the central government in Baghdad; i.e., the Arabs. In other words, the biggest threat for Kurds is the growing strength of Baghdad. They don’t see Turkey as a threat, because they know that Turkey doesn’t have its eye on Kurdistan. The fear comes from the Arabs.

    Is there any possibility of a break between Turkey and the Regional Government?

    Relations with Turkey have been very strong even in the worst of times, even when these relations were maintained using troops. Turkey has seven military liaison offices in the region. Technical relationship, for instance, in security, have never broken off. The connections between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds are very strong. The 1994-1998 Kurdish civil war was in reality a war between Turkey and Iran. Turkey won the struggle then. Turkey always supports Massoud Barzani against Jalal Talabani. Relations are stronger than is supposed. It can be noted that Barzani’s spouse, Ceylan Barzani, is a Kurd from Hakkari.

    Some analysts in the region assert that there is a competition between Nechirvan Barzani and Massoud Barzani. Is there really such a competition?

    Their relationship is a father-son relationship. It is not possible that Massoud Barzani sees Nechirvan, his own nephew and son-in-law of Massoud Barzani, as a threat, because Nechirvan rose thanks to Massoud Barzani. At the upcoming PUK congress, it is expected that Nechirvan will become the party’s leader. We know that if he becomes the party leader, his main objective will be to win more support for his party in Sulaymaniyah.  

    What is Nechirvan Barzani’s view of Turkey?

    Good relations with Turkey are his inheritance from Mullah Mustafa Barzani. He always considered Turkey separately. Nechirvan Barzani always said that the Kurds depend on Turkey’s support during the Kurdish civil war. He says that Turkey fulfilled all commitments on time and in the manner they promised to the PUK during that period. He never forgets that Turkey didn’t leave them in the lurch, but his experiences with the Arabs and the Iranians weren’t like that. He believes that it is not obvious who will love or attack the Kurds of Iraq. In fact he has a saying: “No other government will leave you in the lurch as much as Iran.” Nechirvan is of the opinion that Turkey’s friend is a friend and Turkey’s enemy is an enemy. In other words, in Nechirvan’s eyes, Turkey is a predictable country that lays its cards on the table.

    Is there any change in Iraqi Kurdish public opinion on PKK in consequence of the recent developments? 

    Turkey’s inland and overseas steps have changed the our people’s perspective on the PKK. Previously, Kurds were giving moral support to the organization on account of the fact that Turkey saw them as equivalent to the PKK, failing to discriminatie between them. But Turkey broke the ice with PKK. And this has changed the Iraqi Kurds’ mind. 

    Thank you for expressing your opinions clearly. 

    *This interview was conducted by ORSAM Middle East specialist, Oytun Orhan, and ORSAM’s chief editor, Ogün Duru, in Arbil on May 12, 2010. 
     June 28 2010  
         
    03 September 2010 (ENG / TR)
    02 September 2010 (ENG / TR)
    01 September 2010 (ENG / TR)

    ORSAM Report No: 18

    FROM NEIGHBORHOOD TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCE:
    TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
    (Tr-Русский)

    ORSAM Report No:17

    EVALUATION OF 7 MARCH 2010 IRAQ PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS AND THE NEW POLITICAL EQUATION
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Rapor No: 16

    SULTANATE OF OMAN :
    A COUNTRY ON THE ARAB PENINSULA CAUGHT BETWEEN TRADITIONALISM AND MODERNITY
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No: 15

    OBSERVATION REPORT OF ORSAM DELEGATION ON 
    7 MARCH 2010 IRAQI ELECTIONS 
    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No. 14
    POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ DURING THE PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE ELECTION

    (In Turkish)

    ORSAM Report No. 13
    AN ANALYSIS ON THE POLITICAL STANCE OF THE SHIITE PARTIES AND THE VOTERS, BEFORE THE MARCH 7 ELECTION IN IRAQ
    (In Turkish)

    Report No. 12
    THE INFLUENCE OF THE FACTOR OF IRAQ ON TURKEY’S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES (1990-2008)
    (In Turkish and Russian)

    ORSAM Report No. 11

    THE FORGOTTEN TURKS: TURKMENS OF LEBANON

    ORSAM Report No. 10

    CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN: THE POWER STRUGGLE, REGIONAL INFLUENCES AND RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

    ORSAM Report No. 9

    THE YEMEN ISSUE:
    A STEP TOWARD REGIONAL WAR?

    ORSAM Report No. 8

    ABKHAZIA FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE BLACK SEA 

    ORSAM Report No. 7

    THE FORGOTTEN TURKMEN LAND: DIYALA

    ORSAM Report No. 6

    THE TUZHURMATU TURKMENS: A SUCCESS STORY

    ORSAM Report No. 5
    TURKEY - LEBANON RELATIONS: PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY AMONG THE RELIGIOUS AND SECTARIAN FACTIONS IN LEBANON
     

    ORSAM Report No. 4

    2009 LEBANON ELECTIONS: WINNERS, LOSERS AND TURKEY
    (In Turkish)

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