The chief editor of Kurdistan Gele TV, Jamal Huseyin analyzed the effects of the Iraqi parliamentary elections on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the leadership of Jalal Talabani. Hüseyin said that, with the negative effects of the elections results, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is now in a critical situation. Huseyin points to the factions and movements in the party and said, “The situation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is similar to the Kirkuk problem.”
How do you analyze the results of elections in terms of Iraq’s general political equation?
The results show that there are still strong sectarian and tribal sensibilities. Thus the problems that weaken Iraq remain the same. But we can see that Sadr and the Sunni groups are growing stronger. There is no doubt that Iraq is based on sectarianism. It is hard to get over this. We know that Allawi won votes from the Shiites and Maliki from the Sunnis, but these votes were not given to the groups, they were given to persons.
When Muqtada al-Sadr wins more votes from Sunnis than from Shiites, the Kurds win more votes from Arabs, and Turkmens win votes in Arbil, it can be said that the sectarian and tribal relations have been normalized. None of these groups trust each other. But from now on the system will be based on the groups’ compromises. When we take a look at Kurdistan the Goran being in the Iraqi Parliament is a new development. It is really important that the new government in Baghdad come up with compromises. Currently the focus of the debate is who will be the new prime minister? All the regional nations have positions on the elections. These nations’ policies affect the process of establishing a new government. Iran wants Iraq to be a Shiite nation to use against the U.S. Iran’s red line is that Maliki must be prime minister. Iran won’t give up on Maliki, but if it does, Iran will want al-Jaafari. Sunni Arabs want Allawi. The Kurds are undecided. However, they may prefer Maliki because lots of Allawi’s supporters are Baathists. These are reactions to the group, rather than to Allawi. But there are problems with Maliki as a person. Whichever group supports the implementation of article 140 and gives the presidency to the Kurds will win Kurdish support. It seems like Maliki is the one who will accept most of these conditions. However, I think there will be conflict in Baghdad during this new period.
How do you analyze the effects of Iraq parliamentary elections on the Kurds’ region?
The results were just what the Kurds expected. But there is one surprise. Since they made a mistake in election strategy, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan lost some seats. Arbil and Dohuk was a shock for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan due to tactical mistakes. As for Goran, the only surprise is that the party wasn’t as successful as was expected. We see that after the elections the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Goran and the Islamists have reached a consensus. They will unite for Kurdish rights in Baghdad. They will not bring problems from Kurdistan to Baghdad. Goran is ready to support Jalal Talabani’s presidency, but only if the party is treated well.
For you, what were the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s mistakes in the elections?
The biggest mistake is that they didn’t have many candidates at Arbil. Thus the votes of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan are diffused at Arbil. Goran made the same mistake in Kirkuk. For example, Goran won 2 seats in Arbil with 90 thousand votes, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan couldn’t win even one with 120 thousand votes. The Kurdistan Democratic Party worked really systematically. They all voted for themselves. But voters for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan voted sporadically. As a result of bad strategy the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan lost 6 seats to the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Now it is thought that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s mathematics is weak. (Laughs)
So, how will the elections affect the Kurdish domestic politics? In particular, how will it affect the strategic alliance of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party?
From now on there is no possibility that the alliance will be disturbed. The results won’t effect the Kurdistan region prime ministry. But the effects will be seen gradually in the long term. In October there will be local elections. Each party will be alone in the elections. Since the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party will be independent, the situation of the strategic alliance will be seen then.
How will the elections affect the future of Kirkuk?
From the Kurdish perspective the situation of Kirkuk is like a mother who’s lost her child. When a mother finds her child after a long time that child won’t be the same as when he was gone. But the truth in Kirkuk is different now. The Kurds will never give up Kirkuk. As for me, I don’t believe that Kirkuk will be a Kurdish region. I think that Kirkuk will be a special city. When we take a look at the election results from Kirkuk, we see that the Turkmen-Arab alliance won 6 seats, and the Kurds won 6 seats. But there is no doubt that in Hawija, where only Sunni Arabs live, there was election fraud. Generally, I don’t think that the elections will affect the solutions for the Kirkuk problem, because this is an international problem. There is a need for a third opinion for the solution of Kirkuk. The Kurds in the region are divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. This makes Kirkuk a regional problem. Turkey sees the Kirkuk problem and says that it is a step towards the independence of the Kurds. Thus there is a trust issue. If we can get over the trust issue we can solve the Kirkuk problem. Turkey’s being the full member of European Union will help to solve the Kirkuk problem. Solving the the Kurdish problem in Turkey is very important. We care about this subject very much. Our television broadcast discussions about the democratic opening in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara for 7 hours live. There is a new republic in Turkey. It will have big effects. The Kurds in Turkey have a nationalistic view, and there are doubts about whether the Justice and Development Party really wants change. However, this opportunity should be given its chance.
Why do you think Goran was unsuccessful in the recent parliamentary elections?
Goran used to trust the public. Kurds supported Goran because they were bothered by some of the Kurdistan government’s moves. But in the regional assembly elections, although the party had major support, it lost 30 thousand votes. I think there are two reasons for Goran’s failure. First, they overlooked the election policies after the elections. Second, Goran is no longer a novelty. I think Goran will continue to be strong. But their presence will be centered in Sulaymaniyah. All the leaders of actions are from Sulaymaniyah. Goran didn’t lose many votes in Sulaymaniyah and may win strong support in Sulaymaniyah. I don’t expect them to be successful in other places.
There is a discussion about a “post-Talabani period.” What is your opinion on this?
For me, there will be two effects on Kurdistan. One will negatively affect the alliance of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, because Talabani himself is a counterweigh to the Kurdistan Democratic Party. At the end of this year the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan congress will be held. There will be big difference in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan before and after the congress. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan holds a congress every 20 years. There have been a lot of different points of view. The problem became complex because it wasn’t solved long ago when it should have been. There are different fractions in the party. We can say that there are 6 movements. Not all of them are opinion based. There are financial interest groups.
The congress may be good for, or it may be the end of, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. By saying ‘end,’ we mean wealthy, strong but narrow-based. The Turkmens and the Kurds were seriously affected by the repressive policies of the Saddam Hussein regime. In a way they were in the same side in the struggle to win a more democratic government. But right after 2003, in the disputed regions there was conflict between Turkmens and Kurds, and then Arabs and Turkmens were rapidly growing closer. What should be done to ameliorate the relations between Turkmens and Kurds? Is there any way to do this?
The Kurds in Kirkuk are not ready to solve the Turkmen problem. Those Kurds didn’t trust other groups. The Kurds in Kirkuk act like they’re saying, “In the future you will live with us, but you will be sidelined.” I don’t think that this is good behavior. An official from Iraq’s Turkmens came to Sulaymaniyah. He said that when he was coming there he was a bit worried about the attitudes of the Kurds in Kirkuk, but after that he saw that it was different here. But we can say that in Kirkuk, Turkmens fan the fire. Since the Kurds are strong in Kirkuk, I think they are the ones who should do something. Talabani tried to do things, but his power is sometimes not enough.
For example, Talabani made the Turkmens gave back some houses, and Kurds see this as a betrayal. I think the main reason for this is that the Kurds of Kirkuk are too nationalist. The Kurds should revise their policy. But this seems to be difficult for them. Even if Talabani decides what to do, he is having problems implementing decisions because of domestic resistance.
This interview was held in Sulaymaniyah, by the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies Middle East Researcher, Oytun Orhan, and Managing Editor, Ogün Duru, on May 14, 2010.