



*The military's removal of democratically elected Mursi from power also leads us to be pessimistic regarding the prospects of democratization in the country.*

## The End of Egyptian Spring and Its Challenges for Turkish Foreign Policy

Mısır Baharı'nın Sonu ve Türk Dış Politikasına Tehditleri

Alper Y. DEDE

### Özet

*Arap Baharı'ndan önce Ortadoğu'da demokratikleşme istisnai bir durum olarak görülmekteydi (Arap İstisnailiği). Fakat Arap Baharı'yla bölgede demokratikleşmeyle ilgili bir umut ışığı doğdu. Bununla beraber, Arap Baharı'nın başlamasından yaklaşık ikibuçuk yıl sonra, Arap Baharı'nın ortaya çıkardığı siyasi iyimserlik yerini kötümserliğe bırakmaya başladı. Arap ülkelerindeki siyasi değişimlerin hızı, demokratik taleplerin önüne çıkan engeller yüzünden yavaşlamaya başladı. Bu engeller yüzünden başlangıçtaki iyimser hava yerini şüpheciliğe, zamanla da kötümserliğe terketti. Mısır'da meydana gelen darbe ve darbe yönetiminin sokaklarda halkı katletmesi de bu kötümser havaya ciddi katkıda bulundu. Bu çalışma birbirini tamamlayan iki ayrı kısımdan meydana gelmektedir. Birinci kısım Arap Baharı perspektifinden Mursi'yi iktidardan düşüren askeri darbeyi, Mısır'da demokrasinin geleceğinin nasıl bir çizgi izleyeceğini ve askeriye ile İhvan'ın bu süreçte kendilerini nasıl konumlandıracağını inceleyecektir. İkinci kısım ise Türk modeli tartışmaları ekseninde darbenin Türk dış politikasını nasıl etkilediğini ve darbenin Türk medyası ve Türk dış politika aktörleri tarafından nasıl algılandığını inceleyecektir. Sonuç bölümü her kısmı birbirine bağlayarak konu hakkında genel bir değerlendirme yapacaktır.*

The massacre on August 14 is a major turning point for Egypt's political history. First, from a humanitarian perspective, massacre of innocent people on the streets is outright shameful and brutal. Second, from this point onwards the course of events will be determined by the reciprocal actions of both the military and the Ikhwan.

### Abstract

*Before the Arab Spring, democratization of the Middle East has been considered an exception (Arab exceptionalism). But the Arab Spring prompted optimism regarding democratization of the region. However, roughly about two and a half years after the Arab Spring started, the political tide created by the Arab Spring has turned. The Arab revolutions have gradually subsided as democratic demands for regime change across the Middle East have experienced serious obstacles along the way. Due to these obstacles, initial optimism regarding democratization of the region has waned gradually. Skepticism replaced optimism regarding the democratization process across the region. Thus, it would not be a surprise if the coup and the recent tumultuous course of events in Egypt cause observers to switch from skepticism to pessimism regarding prospects of democratization in the country. This article has two distinct but interrelated sections that complement each other. Section one examines the coup in Egypt deposing Mursi, prospects for democratization and the military's and the Ikhwan's possible courses of action within the context of the Arab Spring. Section two analyzes the impact of the coup on the course of Turkish foreign policy within the context of debates regarding whether Turkey is a viable role model in the region or not in addition to how the coup in Egypt is perceived in Turkey by policy makers and the media. The concluding section ties the two sections together and provides a general evaluation.*

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Coup, Military Rule, Democratization, Egypt, Turkey, Turkish Model,

*Arab Exceptionalism, the AKP, Ikhwan, Mursi, Erdoğan, Sisi*

### Introduction

Successful democratic transitions require, among other things, first the removal of the authoritarian regimes and/or leaders, and second, the establishment of a working democratic system with free and fair elections and accompanying freedoms such as freedom of press, expression, and association. Casual observers usually think that democracies would eventually triumph once the authoritarian regime is gone. However, the second step is harder to accomplish in many cases usually due to the fact that once the authoritarian regime is gone, the coalition of various groups that overthrow the old regime usually breaks apart, leading to conflicts and disagreements on the direction of the newly established democratic system. In such a case, usually elements of the older regime resurface or reassert themselves into the shaky situation seeking more power complicating the course of events in the country.<sup>1</sup> The course of events in Egypt during and after the Arab Spring followed a very similar path.

On July 3, 2013, President Mursi was deposed and put under house arrest by a coup led by Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi who has been Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces as well as the Minister of Defense since August 2012. Since then, Mursi's supporters have been out on the streets protesting Mursi's arrest and demanded his return to power. On both sides of the Nile, the protestors gathered at Al-Nahda and Rabi'a

Al-Adawiyah Squares. On August 14, Egypt woke up to a bloody day when troops opened fire on Mursi's supporters massacring more than two thousand people. Before the massacre, the military urged Mursi's supporters to stop their protests and threatened them with the use of deadly force if they refuse to comply with the military's directive. As events unfold, it appears that the Ikhwan has no intention to back down which will inevitably lead to more deaths at the hands of the military leading one to ask the question whether it is really worth risking thousands of people's lives to prove a point, or to demand Mursi's return to power which the military will not do.

The coup in Egypt and the current state of affairs in the country could be interpreted in several different ways. The following section is going to evaluate the recent events regarding how the current events in Egypt might have affected i) the course of the Arab Spring, ii) Egypt's prospects for democratization, and iii) the Ikhwan's and the Egyptian military's possible courses of action in the foreseeable future. The second section is going to discuss how the coup in Egypt has changed relations between Egypt and Turkey within the context of debates revolving around i) whether Turkey could become a role model for the countries of the region, and ii) how the Turkish media and foreign policy makers perceived the latest events in Egypt.

### **The Coup and the Prospects for Democratization in Egypt**

The Arab Spring is over with Mursi's fall. It would not be an exaggeration to make such a statement. The explanation lies at the very nature of democratic transitions. As briefly discussed in the introduction, the democratic transitions have two distinct phases: the removal of the authoritarian regimes and establishment of a democratic regime through formation of democratic institutions as well as nurturing democratic values and principles. The Arab Spring corresponds to the first phase of transitions, and the second phase in Egypt has not been accomplished yet, and the current course of events has diminished hope in regards to the accomplishment of it. Thus, with

the recent reversal in Egypt, it would not be unacceptable to assert that the Arab Spring is officially over in the region. We also have to remember the current situation in Syria and shaky situation in Tunisia and Libya to reach such a pessimistic conclusion. When the Arab Spring first started in Tunisia and later spread to Egypt, Libya and Syria, there was a wave of optimism in regards to the democratizing potential of the Arab Spring and many commentators compared the Arab Spring to the Third Wave of Democratization through which Southern European, Latin American, and finally the countries of the former Soviet Bloc became democracies. Just like democratization under the Third Wave, the Arab Spring would have spread democracy across the Middle East, a region with authoritarian-bureaucratic status-quo regimes overwhelmed by a series of social and economic problems. However, the reversal in Egypt marks the end of the Arab Spring.

The military's removal of democratically elected Mursi from power also leads us to be pessimistic regarding the prospects of democratization in the country. If we revisit the initial argument of this article regarding the stages of democratic transitions, Egypt, before the coup, was successfully able to pass the first stage and with Mursi's election through democratic elections, was in the course of having a major achievement towards completing the second stage. However, the coup, Mursi's arrest, and the massacre of masses on the streets reversed the whole process. Currently, it now has become extremely difficult to talk about putting Egypt's democratization process on the right track.<sup>2</sup> Considering the country's daunting social and economic problems, it would not be a surprise to expect the Egyptian military to stay in power for extended periods such as the lengthy military regimes of some of the Latin American countries. The Egyptian military would prefer remaining behind the scene in the long term since being unable to solve the social and economic problems of the country would be delegitimizing for them in the long run. Keeping this in mind, it would not be wrong to assume that the Egyptian military doesn't have any incentives to stay in power for an extended period. Indeed, briefly after Mursi's removal from power, the military an-

nounced that in about seven months or so they would switch from military rule to civilian rule after having new elections.

The massacre on August 14 is a major turning point for Egypt's political history. First, from a humanitarian perspective, massacre of innocent people on the streets is outright shameful and brutal. Second, from this point onwards the course of events will be determined by the reciprocal actions of both the military and the Ikhwan. Mursi came to power with the support of a coalition composed of mainly the Ikhwan and the Salafis. However, liberal and secularist Egyptians also conditionally supported Mursi mainly due to the fact that first Mursi promised more democracy and freedom, and Mursi's rival in the presidential race, Ahmed Shafik, had a military background and served under Mubarak as his prime minister, thus making Shafik too reminiscent of the previous authoritarian regime. The literature on democratic transitions suggests that if the second stage of the transition becomes too fragile, the social and political coalitions that prompt democratic change might turn against each other later in the process, thus risking the whole transition process. This is exactly what happened in Egypt. Mursi became more authoritarian and was unable to solve Egypt's daunting social and economic problems. Thus, Mursi quickly lost the conditional support initially provided by the Egyptian liberals and secularists in less than a year, leading to Mursi's demise. In other words, except the core Ikhwan supporters, Mursi seriously alienated himself from the larger societal coalition that supported him in the first place.<sup>3</sup> A second critical mistake committed by Mursi was to underestimate the power of the military which will be discussed in the next section briefly. Mursi's and other Ikhwan members' overemphasis on Mursi's electoral success also contributed to their shortsightedness. Whenever Mursi faced a problem, he bolstered his electoral mandate.

After the August 14 massacre, the military kept killing more Mursi supporters on the streets. Three days before the massacre, the military announced that they would intervene the protes-

tors gathered on the streets. The Ikhwan refused to comply with the military's demand. Mursi and Ikhwan possibly had four purposes in mind while they persistently urged their followers to remain on the streets against the coup: i) it is a matter of principle, there is no turning back from democracy, ii) the passive resistance on the streets would solidify the Ikhwan members and possibly pro-democracy groups in the country against the coup, iii) the massacres might possibly create a split among different segments of the armed forces including the military's leadership cadre since members of the military might refuse brutally killing their fellow citizens, and iii) the massacres might create a wave of protest among the international community, thus leading to international pressure on the military government in Egypt. These possible reasons might be seen as reasonable among the Ikhwan leadership and followers however, it is quite doubtful whether those goals would be achieved after the massacre of thousands and more importantly whether the lives of thousands actually worth achieving one or more of those goals. Considering the current situation in Egypt, commonsense tells us that the Ikhwan leadership has done a lot of miscalculation in their short tenure in power, and insisting on urging people remaining on the streets against oncoming massacres will simply be an addition to their list of miscalculations. Right after the coup that ousted Mursi, the military had already announced a timetable to switch to civilian rule. Considering the fact that the Ikhwan is the most organized and capable political group in the country, their chances to win in a free election after an interim period would have been very high. It appears that the Ikhwan leadership has chosen to expose themselves to the storm instead of waiting for it to pass.

The second stage of democratization process in Egypt has seriously been hurt by the coup, and Egypt has a long way to go if and until Egypt becomes a well-functioning democracy in the future. If the Ikhwan chooses to go underground and starts using violent means against the military rule, this could start a dangerous downward spiral and Egypt could potentially end up like Syria and become a failed state in the long run. It

is too early now to speculate on what is going to happen in the long run since currently there is no clear sign regarding whether the Ikhwan is going to go underground or not. However, the Speaker of Council of Ministers, Sharif Shawky, recently announced that the military government has plans to ban the Ikhwan as a political organization.<sup>4</sup> This move has the potential to push the Ikhwan to go underground and to use violent tactics against the military regime. The Ikhwan had been underground before and sections of the Ikhwan had been involved with terrorism when Gamal Abdel Nasser banned the organization in the late 1950s. Restrictions on the Ikhwan had been eased when Anwar Al Sadat decided to use the Ikhwan as a counterbalance against the leftists in the ASU (Arab Socialist Union) who were trying to undermine his power. After Sadat's assassination, Mubarak chose an accommodationist policy while periodically increasing pressure on the organization as the Ikhwan tried to gain political spaces by winning local elections, becoming more active in professional associations, and entering the Egyptian parliament by showing some Ikhwan members as independent candidates or by electoral coalitions with smaller parties.<sup>5</sup> In short, banning the Ikhwan as a political organization would definitely push the organization underground which had actually happened before, and give the hardliners in the organization an upper hand while tempting the organization to turn to violence.

As discussed briefly earlier, considering the daunting social and economic problems of the country, the military would not be very willing to remain in power for extended time periods. Thus, it would have been more prudent for the Ikhwan to consider this and plan their next move accordingly. Besides the domestic impact of the coup in Egypt, Mursi's removal from office and brutal killings on the streets will definitely change how Egypt relates to other countries and how other countries relate to Egypt. The following section is going to discuss how the coup in Egypt quickly changed the course of Turkish foreign policy on Egypt and how the coup is perceived in the Turkish media.

### **The Coup and Turkish Foreign Policy on Egypt**

Since Turkey has switched from single-party to multi-party regime in 1950, Turkey has socially, politically and economically suffered from the coups and the military's long-term overarching tutelage on the civilian rule. The ruling AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-Justice and Development Party) of Turkey has indeed successfully swayed the balance between the civilian and military authorities for the advantage of the civilian rule in the last ten years or so. The AKP government has gradually distanced the civilian authority from the military while putting some rogue elements in the military on trial for charges of plotting coups in addition to some legal and structural changes limiting military's role in politics. Turkish route to democratization was not smooth. Turkey has experienced five coups (1960, 1971, 1980, 1996, and 2007), still has a constitution written by the military in 1980, and experienced long periods of military tutelage such as the February 28 process.

Mursi's short tenure actually resembles, in some ways, to Turkey's early years of democratization between the first free and fair elections that opened the way for the multi-party system in Turkey (1950) and the military coup of 1960. Both Mursi and Menderes made similar mistakes: underestimating the power of the military while becoming more authoritarian. In the interim period between Mubarak's ousting from office and Mursi's winning of elections, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces dominated the Egyptian political arena. When Mursi came to power, he knew that he had to maintain the delicate balance between the civilian authority and the military. However, Mursi did too little to strengthen the civilian rule in Egypt. Once elected, Mursi announced the retirement of Egypt's top five officers of the military, including Defense Minister and the head of the SCAF, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sami Annan. However, Tantawi and Annan were given top civilian posts as advisors to President Mursi.<sup>6</sup> It appears that by making Annan and Tantawi his top civilian advisors, Mursi



*The second stage of democratization process in Egypt has seriously been hurt by the coup, and Egypt has a long way to go if and until Egypt becomes a well-functioning democracy in the future.*

was possibly hoping that the military threat in Egypt on democracy was over. However, in reality there has been very little progress regarding more transparency and a strong civilian oversight of the military since Mursi assumed power. To make things worse, Egypt's new constitution, which was hastily drafted and ratified, has introduced new measures strengthening the National Defense Council (NDC) which rarely met since its establishment in 1971; and creating a totally new body, the National Security Council, a mostly civilian entity in charge of developing policies for civil defense in times of crises. This left military prerogatives purely in the hands of the NDC. Although the NDC is headed by the President, it was still dominated by members from the ranks of the military (8 out of 14).<sup>7</sup> In other words, the ongoing guardianship role of the Egyptian military had been further strengthened by Mursi. Before the coup, the process of political bargaining in Egypt between the Presi-

dency and the military would make one think that a symbiotic relationship between the two had been evolving, and that emerging symbiotic relationship might have lasted longer. However, the military imposed its will on the civilian rule and took control of the country with the coup.

A second mistake committed by Mursi was becoming more authoritarian. In November 2012, Mursi made a surprise move and gave himself greater powers with a decree which gave his decisions immunity from judicial review. Additionally, his decree barred the courts from dissolving the constituent assembly and the upper house of the Egyptian parliament. This further alienated the coalition that originally helped Mursi win the elections, causing Mursi to lose valuable support in an intricate phase. In the end, Mursi was alone with no political support to back up his presidency except the Ikhwan.<sup>8</sup> On June 30, on the first anniversary of Mursi's coming to power,

mass protests demanded his resignation which was three days before the coup. Mursi overestimated his power while underestimating the military's power and was unable to see the fact that he was alienated and had nowhere to turn to with the notable exception of Turkey. Since Mursi's election Turkey has actively supported Mursi.

There are several reasons behind Turkey's support for Mursi. First, the Ikhwan and the AKP have striking similarities. Both emerged as grassroots political movements against authoritarian-secular regimes whose aim was to maintain the status-quo. Both had a democratic language and represented political manifestation of Islam with the purpose of Islamizing their societies. Furthermore, both struggled against the militaries in their countries. Second, for a variety of reasons, Turkey has increasingly become alienated in her foreign policy in the region, thus designers of Turkish foreign policy including the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan was in dire need of an ally in the region. Turkish foreign policy in Syria had serious troubles, Turkey had cold relations with Iraq and Iran, and Turkish relations with the Saudis and the Persian Gulf countries were not getting any warmer than they used to be. The AKP's and Erdoğan's Turkish foreign policy was based on the assumption that Turkey would feel herself more comfortable in a region that is ruled by Ikhwan-like parties. In other words, Turkish foreign policy sought comfort in supporting political parties and/or movements that was similar to the AKP in ideology, orientation, leadership and organization. This is about Turkey being a role model in the region. According to the "Turkish model" thesis, right after the Arab Spring, with the toppling down of authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes, political parties, like the AKP, would come to power across the region and handle the second phase of the democratic transition through lessons derived from the Turkish experience. Thus, Mursi's coming to power in Egypt was actually materializing of the Turkish model. According to the thesis, after coming to power, Ikhwan-or AKP-like parties would defy the military, connect quickly with the conservative middle class, and move towards

more democratization through democratizing reforms while liberalizing the economy. Third, the composition of Turkish capitalists (especially mid-size entrepreneurs) has been changing during the AKP's tenure. Conservative Anatolian capitalists became market seekers with the purpose of expanding their economic operations through exports.<sup>9</sup> Thus, domestic pressures coming from these export oriented conservative class have increasingly driven the AKP to seek markets in Turkey's immediate neighborhood. Egypt was such a market for those conservative Turkish capitalists who wanted to expand their economic operations in the region. Additionally, coming from conservative backgrounds, these conservative businessmen would get along well with Ikhwan-like bureaucrats in power and businessmen in the region considering the fact that they shared similar and comparable conservative identities and worldviews.

Lessons taken from Turkey's democratization process could be an example for the rest of the region, not necessarily a model because being a model implies that Turkey's democratic experience could be used as a template for the rest of the countries in the region which is a very strong assertion. It is true that certain lessons can be learned from other cases in the process of democratization however, each country's democratization process is unique and it cannot be replicated somewhere else fully. For example, the AKP's electoral backbone in conservative Anatolian cities consists of a group of conservative businessmen dubbed as the *Anatolian Tigers*. Egypt lacks "Egyptian Tigers" that could be a counterpart of the Anatolian Tigers. From a class perspective, the Ikhwan's core base of support is more proliferated than that of the AKP's. Also, Turkish conservative capitalists have a market-oriented approach where economic successes and gains, not pure ideology, are the main driving forces in their political agenda. Indeed, roughly about fifteen years before the AKP's rise to power, the liberal spaces created by former Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal's reforms paved the way for the emergence of this type of market-based Turkish conservative capitalists which is lacking in Egypt. Another significant difference between

Lessons taken from Turkey's democratization process could be an example for the rest of the region, not necessarily a model because being a model implies that Turkey's democratic experience could be used as a template for the rest of the countries in the region which is a very strong assertion.

Turkey and Egypt is about the duration and nature of both countries' democratization process. Unlike most Arab countries of the region including Egypt, Turkey had experienced a gradual process of democratization which allowed all Turkish political actors to take very valuable lessons in the form of a collective political memory. On the contrary, considering Mursi's removal from power on the first anniversary of his coming to power, Egypt lacks that kind of collective political memory that developed through political actors' operating within local and national political institutions over time.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, Turkish conservative political actors have been exposed to strong secularizing factors that are absent in the Egyptian case. Because of space limitations those secularizing factors cannot be debated here in length, however for the purposes of this article, it would suffice to say that Turkish Islamists have quit talking about bringing about the *Shari'a* very long time ago, and anyone who is willing to talk about it would be scorned by the Turkish Islamists. However, Islamizing society with top-down measures and establishing a system based on the *Shari'a* are still an ongoing debate among the Egyptian Islamists.

Since Mursi's election Turkish media has been actively following the developments in Egypt. Interestingly, the mainstream media in Turkey, with a few exceptions, has been failing to accurately analyze and portray what had happened in Egypt during Mursi's tenure. From the mainstream Turkish media, the Turkish people mostly got the impression that everything in Egypt had been on track and the situation in the coun-

try had been improving during Mursi's tenure in power. The designers of the Turkish foreign policy committed the same mistake as did the Turkish media. Turkish foreign policy on Egypt is based on the assumption that everything in Egypt was on track, the threat of a military coup was rather weak and Mursi had control of the events in the country. When Mursi's base of support in Egypt was about thirty percent of the population at most, the Turkish media portrayed a different picture until the very end of Mursi. According to the Turkish media's account of events, Mursi had large base of support and everything in Egypt was on track. Likewise, the same misperception or miscalculation troubled the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The two have been silent when for example Mursi hastily drafted and ratified the Egyptian constitution with no debate or when Mursi gave himself greater powers with a decree which gave his decisions immunity from judicial review and barred the courts from dissolving the constituent assembly and the upper house of the Egyptian parliament. The Turkish media followed suit, and with a few exceptions, Turkish mainstream media was silent when Mursi took those non-democratic measures.

### Conclusion

The coup in Egypt is going to have multiple repercussions across the region. The first effect of the coup is Turkish alienation in the region. Turkey lost a valuable ally in the region after the coup. There are assertions in the Turkish mainstream media that the Sunni bloc has been



weakened after the coup in Egypt which inevitably strengthened the Shi'a bloc. This interpretation might look plausible for casual observers however, before the coup the Sunni bloc had not been completely solidified; indeed, it had not been a bloc at all. Additionally, a country whose soft power and allies are diminishing would find it harder to pursue its own foreign policy objectives. Thus, Turkey will find it difficult to pursue her foreign policy objectives in the new political setting in the region. The second effect of the coup is a sense of relief felt by the authoritarian regimes across the Middle East. The Arab Spring earlier put the authoritarian-bureaucratic-traditional regimes of the region between a rock and a hard place. Those regimes were quite fearful of having mass protests on their own streets shaking the foundations of their authority. Indeed, authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states took some preventive measures to stop the spread of the Arab Spring such as paying a lip service to democracy and increasing the amount of money reserved for social programs for the poor and the middle class. However, the coup in Egypt signaled for the average citizens on the street that risking lives for democracy could easily end up with a military regime that could be worse than their existing regimes. The third effect of the coup is that the coup strongly signaled the failure of the Arab Spring thus weakening the hands of pro-democratic groups across the region. In other words, pro-democratic forces would find it very difficult after the coup to convince their followers that it worth risking their lives for more freedom. Additionally, a more specific effect of the coup will be on Turkey's Zero Problems with Neighbors policy. Turkey will find it difficult to maintain her Zero Problems policy given the decline of Turkey's allies in the region. Thus, it is apparent that the relationship between Turkey and Egypt's military regime will be problematic in the foreseeable future.

The coup also reinforced the skepticism of the region's peoples in regards to the West's sincerity when it comes to promoting democracy across the Middle East. The international community including the U.S. and the EU has been quite

silent about the coup ousting democratically elected Mursi and about the following massacre of Mursi's supporters on the streets. By the people of the region, the international community's silence is perceived as approval of the coup in Egypt. Since the beginning, Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Ministry have rightfully been denouncing the coup, the massacres, and criticizing the international community's silence on the issue. The West's dilemma could be promptly explained by the West's pragmatism in terms of their foreign policy objectives. It is mostly pragmatism, not principles that guide their foreign policies. In other words, when there is a conflict between their principles and interests, the interests are usually preferred over principles. Earlier, the West, and the U.S. in particular, had been similarly silent about Israel's and Al-Fatah's dismissal of democratically elected HAMAS which did not really surprise careful observers of the politics of the region.

What are the possible scenarios in Egypt for the foreseeable future in regards to the democratization process? One scenario, which is an optimist one, is that the military remains in power shortly, allows for multiparty elections after an interim period, a new constitution is written, and the current ordeal is left behind as a bad memory in the collective conscience of the Egyptian people. A second scenario, which is a pessimist one, is that the military remains in power in the long run, the Ikhwan is banned and it goes underground, more Ikhwan members are killed on the streets, the Ikhwan goes into a protracted war with the military regime, and finally Egypt becomes a failed state. Considering the Speaker of the Council of Ministers Sharif Shawky's recent announcement about banning the Ikhwan as a political organization, the pessimist scenario is more likely to take place than the optimist one. At this point, given the silence of the West regarding the coup in Egypt, a foreign involvement for the solution of the crisis in Egypt seems highly unrealistic. After the August 14 massacre on the streets, the U.S. State Department promptly announced that it would reconsider the annual U.S. aid given to Egypt. Whether the U.S. ceases to provide the annual aid or not, the financial aid

provided by the Saudis and Gulf Arab states in the early days of the coup definitely indicates that when and if the military regime needs funds, the authoritarian monarchies of the region would be ready to send them, strengthening the hand of the Egyptian military and making it easier for the Egyptian military to stay in power. However, there is a caveat. Given the daunting social and

economic problems of the country, it would be self-defeating for the Egyptian military to stay in power for the long term. The military would not want to delegitimize itself by doing so. All the scenarios aside, and despite the gloomy picture in Egypt, we must admit that the genie of democracy is out of the bottle and it will be extremely difficult to put it back into the bottle.

0

## ENDNOTES

- 1 For more detailed discussion of democratic transitions see for example: O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986; Linz, Juan J., Alfred C. Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies" *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (2) 1996, pp. 14-33; O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Scott Mainwaring, J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.) *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* University of Notre Dame Press, 1992; Putnam, Robert D.; et al. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; and Przeworski, Adam; et al. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- 2 Berman, Sheri. "Marx's Lesson for the Muslim Brothers" *The New York Times*, August 10, 2013 [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/marxs-lesson-for-the-muslim-brothers.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/opinion/sunday/marxs-lesson-for-the-muslim-brothers.html?_r=0) Accessed: August 12, 2013
- 3 Harisi Mohamad A. "A spectacular fall from grace for Egypt's Brotherhood" AFP, August 18, 2013. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/18/spectacular-fall-from-grace-for-egypt-brotherhood/> Accessed on: August 19, 2013.
- 4 Douglas, Hilary. "Ban the Muslim Brotherhood, says Egypt's Prime Minister as death toll hits 1,000" *Express*, August 18, 2013. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/422898/Ban-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-says-Egypt-s-Prime-Minister-as-death-toll-hits-1-000> Accessed: August 19, 2013
- 5 Palmer, Monte. *The Politics of the Middle East*, Thomson, Belmont: CA, 2007
- 6 BBC News, "Egypt Leader Mursi Orders Army Chief Tantawi To Resign" *News, Middle East*, August 12, 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19234763> Accessed: August 16, 2012.
- 7 Sayigh, Yazid. "Morsi and Egypt's Military" *Al-Monitor*, January 8, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/morsi-army-egypt-revolution.html> Accessed: February 12, 2013.
- 8 Sabry, Bassem. "Absolute Power: Morsi Decree Stuns Egyptians" *Al-Monitor*, November 22, 2012, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/morsi-decree-constitution-power.html> Accessed: December 8, 2012
- 9 Demir, Ömer., Mustafa Acar, Metin Toprak. "Anatolian Tigers or Islamic Capital: Prospects and Challenges" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Routledge, pp. 166-188
- 10 Dede, Alper Y. "The Arab Uprisings: Debating the "Turkish Model"" *Insight Turkey*, 13 (2) 2011, pp. 24-32