Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Civil War: Returning to the Policy of Diplomatic Prudence

The circumspect and prudent approach recently observed in Saudi Arabia’s policy towards the Syrian civil war bespeaks a new phase in the Saudi administration’s Syria policy. Until recently, the Saudi administration has taken multiple operational and diplomatic steps within a framework of active and comprehensive involvement strategy in the civil war ranging from lending logistical assistance to armed groups fighting in Syria to making statements about the possibility of a direct military operation in Syria in collaboration with Turkey. Nevertheless, it is lately observed in Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy that these kinds of measures that could be considered elements of a direct, active, and comprehensive engagement strategy in the Syrian civil war have been superseded by a reticent, prudent, and limited approach giving precedence to multilateral diplomacy. This shift in the Saudi approach towards the Syrian civil war is a result of some developments in Saudi Arabia’s internal and external politics.

Equilibria in Syria

First of all, the emergence of ISIS as a de facto and effective party to the Syrian civil war has brought about a forced revision in Saudi Arabia’s policy as in the policies of other regional actors. The Saudi administration is emphatic in its diplomatic discourse that the only method of a successful struggle against ISIS is through a struggle against the Assad regime. According to Saudi officials, the main problem in Syria is not ISIS insofar as it amounts to just a symptom. The path to a resolution in Syria, it is contended, is delivering military aid to the Free Syrian Army to prevent further massacres of the Assad regime since, being a ‘cancer-like’ organization, ISIS breeds in structures that grow feeble and cannot defend themselves. However, global and some regional actors consider ISIS the primary security threat in Syria, have made the struggle against ISIS the main axis in their policies regarding the course of events in the Syrian civil war, and accordingly, consider the Assad regime a secondary security issue. The divergent order of preferences of global and some regional actors have undermined the efficacy and legitimacy of Saudi Arabia’s security policies.

Second, for the Saudi administration, the continuation of the policy of active involvement in the Syrian civil war at the same pace carries the risk of exacerbating the already strained relations of Saudi Arabia with the US. One of the aims of Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman’s visit to Washington in mid-June was to mend the damage in relations with the US. Therefore, in the meeting of Muhammad bin Salman with President Obama, the agenda on Syria did not comprise assistance to the Syrian opposition but the prospective transition period in Syria. In a similar vein, the policy of active involvement in the Syrian civil war has the potential to harm Saudi Arabia’s relations with Russia. A noticeable indication of the shift in the Saudi policy appeared in relations with Russia. The Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir visited Moscow on May 26. Three days after this visit, which was a sign of Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Russian influence in Syria, Muhammad Alloush resigned from its position as the chief peace negotiator of the Syrian National Council in line with the demand of Russia expressed for a long time.Several observers attributed this resignation to the pressure of Saudi Arabia. The important point here is that Saudi Arabia has developed a diplomatic attitude to preclude the Syrian problem from becoming a detrimental element in its relations with Russia. This revision necessitates a more prudent approach towards the Syrian civil war for the Saudi administration.

Third, the Syrian civil war constitutes one of the areas in Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Iran in regional geopolitics. With its material and ideational dimensions, this rivalry, called by phrases like the regional cold war or the cold war of Islam, persists in Syria through proxy wars as in several arenas. Still, in terms of its relations with Iran, two significant developments have recently paved the way for Saudi Arabia to moderate its military and political engagements in the Syrian civil war. First, the tension between Riyadh and Tehran greatly escalated as a result of the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr by the Saudi administration followed by the Saudi embassy in Tehran being attacked and stormed by Iranian protesters and the subsequent Saudi cessation of diplomatic ties with Iran as a response. In consequence, with the additional support of Gulf states to Saudi Arabia in varying degrees, for the Saudi administration Iran has been isolated in regional geopolitics to some extent. Iran’s regional isolation has enabled Saudi Arabia to withdraw from its regional engagements. The second significant development is the concentration of Iran’s military and diplomatic engagements on Iraq. The operations against ISIS in various regions of Iraq, especially in the cities of Mosul and Fallujah, conducted with the extensive participation of Iranian military troops, have induced the Iranian administration to assess the developments in Syria of secondary importance. That its primary regional rival has reduced its involvement in the Syrian civil war has facilitated for Saudi Arabia to diminish its own involvement.

More Important Matters

Yet another cause of the reticent, prudent, and limited approach giving precedence to multilateral diplomacy in Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy is that the current course and the future outcome of the civil war in Yemen has gained a good deal more significance in Riyadh’s regional policy than the developments in Syria. Bearing the potential to have an impact on Saudi Arabia more directly and more profoundly with security and political reverberations, the civil war in Yemen is at the top of Saudi Arabia’s regional agenda. With the military operation launched in April 2005 under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has become a directly involved party to the civil war in Yemen rather than through proxies. To what extent this military operation will succeed for Saudi Arabia in achieving its objectives is a quite sensitive issue for the Saudi administration.

On the other hand, it can be stated that the Saudi administration views a political settlement as the preferred option for the crisis in Yemen.In the wake of the ceasefire decision of parties on April 10 in Yemen, political negotiations are underway in Kuwait. Still, the peace talks have yet to overcome the disagreements over a couple of points. The most serious issue of dispute is the demand of the Yemeni government in exile that the Houthi militants in control of the capital Sana’a lay down their arms. The statements of high ranking Saudi generals about the likelihood of a military operation against Sana’a in case of a failure of peace talks points out that the developments in Yemen will continue to be high priority for Saudi Arabia. In addition, another serious security threat for the Saudi administration emanating from Yemen is the local al-Qaeda formation organized under the label ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’ and took control of several towns. Thus, the initial target of the land operations of the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia happened to be al-Qaeda members in Southern Yemen as opposed to Houthi militants dominant in Northern Yemen. With the objective of drawing al-Qaeda members out of the towns on the coastline, the city of al-Mukalla, considered the center of al-Qaeda in Yemen, was captured by the coalition forces at the end of April. Yet, it is not possible to state that the al-Qaeda threat in Yemen has been completely eliminated.

An additional cause of Saudi Arabia’s return to the policy of diplomatic prudence in the Syrian civil war is developments inside the country. On April 25, the Saudi administration released a rather comprehensive restructuring program, which was announced to the public with the title ‘Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030,’ despite the official title being ‘National Transformation Program.’ Prepared under the guidance and supervision of Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, this program envisions a radical and sweeping transformation of the Saudi economy. The adverse effects of the prevailing economic difficulties have been decisive in the appraisal of the preparation and implementation of such a program as an imperative undertaking by the incumbent Saudi administration. The oil prices floating at low levels in the global oil market have forced the Saudi administration for a revision in its economic policies. Without doubt, the deliberate policy of Saudi Arabia not to take steps towards reducing its oil supply has an effect on the floating of oil prices at low levels. This situation has contributed to the Saudi administration facing a budget deficit of about 100 billion dollars in 2015, and the Saudi economy shrank 13% last year. As another example, due to the financial risks the current situation has generated, the credit rating of Saudi Arabia was downgraded in May. The primary target of the Saudi Vision 2030 is to diminish the dependency on oil in the national economy. Currently, the revenues from oil exports constitutes 80% of the budget. The reform program announced with the objectives of increasing non-oil revenues, reducing public expenditures to a certain extent, and creating additional employment in the Saudi economy until 2030 is the overriding and most delicate matter on the agenda of the Saudi administration. The attention of the Saudi administration being directed inwards has moved the Syrian civil war, along with some other areas in foreign policy, to the background.

There are a number of reasons behind the recent adoption of Saudi Arabia of a reticent, prudent, and limited approach giving precedence to multilateral diplomacy towards the Syrian civil war, which could be designated as a policy of diplomatic prudence. Similar to Saudi Arabia, there are multifaceted determinants that shape the Syria policies of each one of the operational and/or diplomatic parties to the Syrian civil war, and understanding the revisions and the reversals in the policies of relevant parties is only possible through evaluating all these determinants together.

This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of "Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Civil War: Returning to the Policy of Diplomatic Prudence”